Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants -- The New Duty to Protect from Foreseeable Attack by ODonnell, Kevin
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 4 Article 6
Fall 1984
Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants --
The New Duty to Protect from Foreseeable Attack
Kevin ODonnell
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin ODonnell, Landlord Liability for Crime to Florida Tenants -- The New Duty to Protect from Foreseeable Attack, 11 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
979 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol11/iss4/6
LANDLORD LIABILITY FOR CRIME TO FLORIDA
TENANTS-THE NEW DUTY TO PROTECT FROM
FORESEEABLE ATTACK
KEVIN J. ODONNELL
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent imposition in Florida of the landlord's duty to miti-
gate the risk to tenants of foreseeable criminal attack' requires an
evaluation of the elements and scope2 of the duty, so that land-
lords will know what level of protection is expected from them, and
tenants will know what level they can expect. The purpose of this
comment is threefold: to examine Florida case law discussing a
landlord's duty, to explain why courts differ about the nature and
scope of this duty, and to attempt to define the direction in which
the law may be headed with respect to the duty to protect.
The traditional rule holds that there is no duty obliging one pri-
vate individual to protect another from criminal attack absent a
special relationship or responsibility.' However, the trend of late
1. See Green Cos. v. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Ten Assocs. v. Mc-
Cutchen, 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1981);
Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see also
Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Trentacost v.
Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980); Henszey & Weisman, What Is the Landlord's Responsi-
bility for Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises?, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 104 (1977); Selvin,
Landlord Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks on Tenants: Developments Since Kline, 9
REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1981); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 3D 331 (1972).
2. "Scope" is used in this comment in its usual sense as denoting those risks of a partic-
ular course of conduct that would be foreseen by a reasonable person. E.g., Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). As for the areas in which the tenant must be
protected, these include the common areas and areas only accessible through the common
areas.
3. E.g., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.37 (A. Casner ed. 1952); R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY 234[1], [2] (1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Id. The RESTATEMENT does not explicitly include the landlord-tenant relationship within its
definition of a "special relationship." As a subset of the general rule, traditionally, the land-
lord-tenant relationship did not impose a duty on landlords to control the criminal acts of
strangers, and tenants bore the full responsibility for protecting themselves from crime. See
Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View
from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEo. L.J. 1153, 1161-68 (1971). See also W. PRosSE,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 348-49 (4th ed. 1971).
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requires some landlords to take reasonable steps to protect their
tenants from foreseeable attack.' After examining the facts of two
recent Florida decisions,5 this comment will discuss the reasons for
the change in the law and the effect that those reasons have had on
the scope and nature of the duty.' Of special significance are the
issues of foreseeability, the evidence relevant to providing notice,
and proximate cause, each of which has elicited divergent views
from Florida's judiciary. Significant also are the variety of tests
used to establish the existence of the duty to protect and the in-
sight these tests provide into the differing attitudes as to the
proper role of the jury. Finally, the ability of landlords to excul-
pate themselves from their negligent failure to discharge their duty
will be considered.
7
II. Two RECENT FLORIDA CASES INVOLVING THE DUTY TO
PROTECT
According to the Third District Court of Appeal in Green Com-
panies v. DiVincenzo,8 the occurrence of diverse crime throughout
a neighborhood provides constructive notice, alerting the prudent
landlord that reasonable safety measures must be in place to se-
cure tenant safety. 9 In DiVincenzo the plaintiff, a tenant in an of-
fice complex, was seriously injured when he returned to his un-
locked, unattended office from the bathroom. It was approximately
6:00 p.m. when the incident took place. When DiVincenzo first
rented in 1972, four years before the attack, security was tighter,
with a guard at the building's main entrance from 4:00 p.m. until
11:00 p.m. By 1974, the guard was gone and the door was not
locked until 7:00 p.m., at which time a camera, activated and
viewed from a separate building, began monitoring an entrance
equipped with an electronic lock and buzzer."0 According to the
record, no prior violent criminal incidents had been reported in the
4. See Florida decisions cited supra note 1. Florida case law thus far requires multi-unit
commercial and multi-unit residential landlords to take reasonable steps to protect in those
districts which recognize the duty. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87; Holley, 382 So. 2d at 99-
100. A multi-unit can be defined here to include any unit which is attached to another unit
by a common area over which the landlord retains control.
5. Green Cos. v. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Whelan v. Dacoma En-
terprises, Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
6. See infra notes 40-156 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
8. 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
9. Id. at 87-88.
10. Id. at 87.
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building, which was situated in a high-crime area."
The jury found that the landlord's negligence contributed sev-
enty-five percent to the plaintiff's injury, while the plaintiff's own
negligence contributed the remaining twenty-five percent. The
award of $562,500 was affirmed. 2 The court relied on the test an-
nounced earlier in Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc.'s
That decision, based in part on the foreseeable nature of criminal
activity in an apartment complex which had been the scene of at
least twenty violent crimes in one year," stated:
Particularly in view of the evidence concerning the past record,
and therefore the future foreseeability of violent crime at its
premises, a jury could properly find that a discharge of the land-
lord's duty to keep the common areas reasonably safe required
that a guard or other security measures be provided ... ."
DiVincenzo held that proof of a dangerous condition in the
neighborhood was adequate to show that crime was foreseeable on
the premises, at least when looked at in light of the landlord's past
security practices. The landlord was therefore required to take and
maintain reasonable steps to protect his tenants.' 6 Once the duty
was found, it was for the jury to decide "whether reasonable care
required that the stricter security precautions previously taken
should have been in effect on the evening of the attack.' 7 The
court would not conclude as a matter of law that the burden of
continuing the previous methods outweighed the likelihood of such
an assault occurring.' 8
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Pearson discussed what he saw as
an improper extension of Holley to include office buildings.'9 How-
ever, DiVincenzo quells uncertainty as to which types of build-
ings20 and tenants the duty extends. Clearly, responsibility does
not end at the door sill, as the landlord was held liable even
11. Id. at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 88.
13. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
14. Id. at 99.
15. Id. at 99-100 (footnotes omitted).
16. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87-88.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 88.
19. Id. at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
20. The distinction between applying the duty to residences and to offices has gained
little acceptance. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 478 n.24
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
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though the attack occurred wholly within DiVincenzo's office.2 1 In-
clusion of attacks occurring wholly within the leased premises con-
templates extension of the early duty,22 but this extension was rec-
ognized in Holley.23 Judge Pearson also felt it unreasonable to
premise the duty on evidence of criminal activity occurring at an
adjacent shopping center, generally believing the matter to be one
more properly for contract or legislative action.24 Due to the belief
that the likelihood of the crime and combined with the magnitude
of the risk did not outweigh the burden of protecting against it, the
dissenting opinion would have granted the landlord's motion for
directed verdict.25
Before going further, several points are worth early emphasis.
The dangerous condition element the DiVincenzo opinion alludes
to is important for at least two reasons. First, its presence was es-
sential to finding a duty to protect and, second, to proving proxi-
mate cause. As the dissent inferred, an issue arises as to when the
foreseeability of a criminal attack on the premises is presumed be-
cause of the presence of crime in an area, as shown by police
records. Given the modern urban condition, the duty to protect
would seem to automatically arise within almost every city.2
The cause in fact issue,27 also deserving of early mention, sur-
prisingly was absent from consideration in DiVincenzo. No evi-
dence was reported from which a jury could infer that
DiVincenzo's attacker would not have entered the premises posing
as a patron of one of the businesses even had a guard been posted.
The nature of an office building demands it be left open to the
public. 2 8 Failure to require a plaintiff to prove what precautions
would have prevented an attack has two effects. First, plaintiffs
21. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87; accord Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C.
1969).
22. E.g., Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
23. The court reasoned that access to Holley's apartment must have been through the
common area. Holley, 382 So. 2d at 101.
24. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting). See infra notes 64-99 and
accompanying text.
25. Id.
26. Id. But see, e.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. Gilday, 398 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA) (testi-
mony concerning number of criminal complaints filed within police zone surrounding a hotel
held inadmissible as not probative of notice to hotel), petition for rev. denied, 411 So. 2d
382 (Fla. 1981).
27. Before liability may attach, there must be a causal connection between the breach of
a duty and an injury such that, but for the breach, the injury would not have occurred. W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, § 41, at 236-41; see also infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text.
28. Kline, 439 F.2d at 490 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). See Henszey & Weisman, supra
note 1, at 122-25.
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need not show that, had reasonable steps been taken, the assault
would not have occurred. Second, plaintiffs need not show that a
landlord's unreasonable precautionary practices in fact caused an
attack, as the jury may infer this.29 Other than close surveillance
and an armed escort within striking distance, what could stop a
patron bent on assaulting someone? 0 What less would a jury find
reasonable?
At the other end of the spectrum from DiVincenzo sits Whelan
v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc.'1 In Whelan, the complaint alleged
that an intruder forced entry into the tenant's locked apartment
where she was raped and assaulted in front of her young son who
was also assaulted and battered. It was further alleged that there
had been many other incidents of burglary and violence occurring
both within and without the units.32 The essence of the holding
can be traced to the following allegations:
The landlord . . .undertook to control the security system by
forbidding the installation of any locks . . .without the explicit
consent of the landlord .... Thus, . . . the landlord was in con-
trol and responsible for the types and number of locking de-
vices .... Notwithstanding that duty,. . . the assailant was able
to gain entry into the tenant's apartment due to unsatisfactory
defective and ineffective locks on the exterior apartment door
and/or because of the existence of unlimited passkeys. 3
The court held that the landlord had no duty to protect.
"[O]therwise, each victimized tenant would sue his landlord every
time a rape, murder, assault, arson, robbery or burglary occurred
on or about any leased premises, be they single, multi-family or
commercial."'" The court noted the absence of allegations that any
statute had been violated, or that a lease or any implied contract
had been breached.85 Holley was distinguished because of its spe-
cific reference to a contractual responsibility arising out of an ap-
portionment of rent, a portion of which was earmarked for security
guards. Finally, the court held that the complaint did state a cause
29. See infra notes 129-143 and accompanying text.
30. See Reichenbach v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366, 1368 (Fla. 5th DCA
1981) (Cowart, J., specially concurring).
31. 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
32. Id. at 507.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 508.
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of action sounding in negligence," based on the traditional the-
ory37 that where defects are unknown to the tenant, but known to
the landlord, they may give rise to a cause of action.38 Judge Ber-
anek, dissenting, felt that the majority went too far and would add
to the elements of the cause of action the requirements that there
be a substantial breach of contract, that the injuries be caused by
the breach and that the injuries be foreseeable."9
III. THE REASON FOR FINDING A DUTY TO PROTECT GENERALLY
The divergence evident in Florida case law is in part attributable
to Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,4"
wherein alternative theories were employed to impose the duty to
protect.4' Because the nature of the duty was seen as duplicitous,
the standard of care owed by the landlord to his tenants in Kline
similarly partook of both tort and contract.42
Kline attempted to reflect emergent social concerns. The policy
the court adopted was based upon a recognition of the change ur-
banization had wrought on the landlord-tenant relationship. The
court was not, however, attempting to spread risk or require that
there be insurance for damage already done."' Kline determined
36. Id.
37. E.g., Butler v. Maney, 200 So. 226 (Fla. 1941); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant §
417(3)(c) (1968).
38. Whelan, 394 So. 2d at 508. Unfortunately, the case was cast in a different light by at
least one commentator who saw it as an extension of Holley. See Browder, The Taming of a
Duty-The Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. Rav. 99, 145-46 (1982).
39. Whelan, 394 So. 2d at 508 (Beranek, J., dissenting).
40. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
41. See infra note 75.
42. Kline, 439 F.2d at 485. If tort theory has been adopted, the standard is that of rea-
sonable care under all the circumstances and/or that level of care customarily provided. If
contract theory is implied, the same relative degree of security throughout the tenancy and/
or the taking of those protective measures which only the landlord has the power to provide
are required. Cf. Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980).
43. Kline, 439 F.2d at 487-88. Compare Selvin, supra note 1, at 314-15, wherein the
author states that the landlord provides a more efficient vehicle for arranging patrols and
can prevent duplicative effort. So much was implicit in Kline, yet Selvin finds that "a land-
lord is in the best position to ensure against the risk of criminal attacks. While tenants must
otherwise bear such costs alone, the costs of protection undertaken by landlords may be
effectively spread throughout the community by the availability of liability insurance to
cover such losses." Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
In response, it is questionable whether tenants could not purchase insurance themselves if
they so desired. Also, it is unlikely that the burden of protection would be spread any fur-
ther than a particular tenant community. The costs of protection might be disproportion-
ately borne by those least able to afford them. The cost of providing security guards might
approximate the minimum wage ($3.35/hour), multiplied by the hours in a day (24), and
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that "[t]he duty is the landlord's because by his control of the ar-
eas of common use and common danger he is the only party who
has the power to make the necessary repairs or to provide the nec-
essary protection."" The intent was that the modern urban land-
lord take reasonable steps to "minimize the predictable risk" 5 and
pass the cost along to the tenant,"' while displaying "reasonable
care in all the circumstance [s], the specific measures to achieve
this standard vary[ing] with the individual circumstances. '47 Thus,
by imposing liability, courts could provide the economic incentive
to upgrade security. At the very least, there would be no toleration
of any relaxation of security.4 8 Tenants could not be expected to
guard the garage entranceways, to provide scrutiny at the main
entrance of the building, to patrol the common hallways and ele-
vators, to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the build-
ing, to provide additional locking devices on the main doors, to
provide a system of announcement for authorized visitors only, to
close the garage doors at appropriate hours, and to see that the
entrance was manned at all times.49
Therefore, the duty would be placed on the party supposed to have
the capacity to take such measures. The power held by the land-
lord made it suitable for a court to impose liability for two reasons.
First, the relationship between landlord and tenant underwent
change so that it is now more analogous to the innkeeper-guest re-
lationship.50 This is because the tenant submits to the control of
again by the days in a year (365), which equals about $30,000 per year. As to the need for 24
hour service, see Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 412 N.E.2d 472 (Ill. 1980), wherein
negligence was based on the landlord having increased the risk during those periods when
the building's guards were off duty.
"[T]he alternative appears to be legislative action to provide more efficient and extensive
crime control and prevention. This equitably spreads the burden over the whole community
rather than just the landlord and tenant, because it is the community at large. . . which is
the ultimate beneficiary." Comment, Landlord Held Negligent for Criminal Assault by
Third Party Intruder on Tenant, 55 MINN. L. Rav. 1097, 1111 (1971). It might be noted
that the apartment building in Kline housed well over 500 occupants. Id.
44. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 488.
47. Id. at 485-86 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 486. See DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87. See also Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate
Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980).
49. Kline, 439 F.2d at 480.
50. Id. at 482. Hotels have a duty to take reasonable care for the protection of their
patrons. E.g., Highlands Ins. Co. v. Gilday, 398 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for rev.
denied, 411 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1981); Rosier v. Gainesville Inns Assocs., Ltd., 347 So. 2d 1100
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the landlord. So much was asserted by the plaintiff in Whelan,
where it was alleged that the landlord's permission was required to
put extra locks on the front door.51 Further, the tenancy is eco-
nomically beneficial to the landlord. In short, the relationship is
characterized by submission and dominance, especially if apart-
ments are in short supply.5
2
Second, courts impose liability because the landlord retains sub-
stantial physical or structural control over the premises. Tenants
have neither the inclination, resources or, for the most part, the
expertise required to make their dwellings impervious to crime.
The failure to recognize that the duty is a product of both the
landlord/tenant relationship and of the landlord's retention of
physical control can lead to unreasonable requests upon landlords.
Today, dissenters53 and commentators"4 scoff at the canard that
"the landlord is not the insurer of tenant safety, 5 5 and call the
result a form of strict liability.56 It is one thing to fix stairs and
know the job done, but quite another to know what a jury will
think were reasonable precautions to prevent crime.57
IV. THE PHYSICAL AREA TO WHICH THE DuTY EXTENDS
In Medina v. 187th Street Apartments, Ltd.,58 the plaintiff was
mugged in the landlord's parking lot as he was returning to his car
after escorting two ladies to their apartment. The manager of the
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (foreseeability and proximate cause are questions for the jury); Annot.,
70 A.L.R.2D 621 (1960). The innkeeper-guest relationship is considered "special," and an
affirmative duty to protect has long been placed on innkeepers. See supra note 4. See gener-
ally W. PaossER, supra note 3, § 56.
For an analysis of the social policies germane to a consideration of whether a relationship
should entail a concommitant duty to protect, see Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the
Conduct of Another, 43 YALz L.J. 886 (1934).
51. Whelan, 394 So. 2d at 507.
52. Cf. infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text (discussion of the landlord's ability to
exculpate). See also Stolzenberg v. Forte Towers South, Inc., 430 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983); Colon v. Lara, 389 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
53. Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 108 (D.C. 1980) (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
54. Recent Developments, Expanding the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitabil-
ity: A Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 1493, 1518 (1980).
55. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481; Ten Assocs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 3d
DCA), petition for rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1981).
56. Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983); Orlando Execu-
tive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442, 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (Cowart, J., dissenting).
57. 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981); but cf. Ten Assocs., 398 So. 2d at 862 (reasonableness a jury question).
58. 405 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); accord Loeser v. Nathan Hale Gardens, Inc., 425
N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
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apartments testified to having knowledge of previous muggings at
the complex and a police officer characterized the apartment com-
plex as being in a high-crime area.59 The appellate court reversed
the directed verdict for the defendant.6 0 The court found that the
trial court properly classified the plaintiff as an invitee of the land-
owner. Since the court would not hold that the violent act was un-
foreseeable as a matter of law,"1 a triable issue therefore existed.62
Thus, the landlord's duty extends to the entire premises. The duty
has been found where an attack occurred in a leased apartment, in
common hallways and in apartment parking lots, even when such
areas are readily accessible to police patrol and protection. As was
said in another context:
Since all landowners owe a general duty of care to their invitees,
the existence of prior criminal activity of an assaultive nature on
their property, or in the area, under the majority view, makes a
similar assault on every invitee reasonably foreseeable and
thereby subjects every landowner to liability if "reasonable pre-
cautions" were not taken regardless of whether the precautions
would have prevented the assault. 3
V. FINDING THE DUTY TO PROTECT
Foreseeability and Evidence Relevant to Establishing A Duty
to Protect in a Given Situation
Another case intimating expansion of tort liability for the negli-
gent failure to protect is Relyea v. State." While much of Relyea
discussed sovereign immunity, the court found that "to impose a
duty upon a landowner to protect an invitee . ..a plaintiff...
must allege and prove that the landowner had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of prior, similar criminal acts committed upon
invitees." 65
The complaints filed in Relyea allege that the two decedents at-
59. Medina, 405 So. 2d at 486.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 487.
63. Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442, 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
(Cowart, J., dissenting); but see, e.g., Drake v. Sun Bank & Trust Co., 377 So. 2d 1013, 1014
(Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (not adopting the majority view alluded to by Judge Cowart); see also
infra notes 64-99 and accompanying text.
64. 385 So. 2d 1378 .(Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
65. Id. at 1383.
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tended class at a remote building on the campus of Florida Atlan-
tic University (FAU). Both ladies arrived in the same car, parking
near the building entrance. As they were leaving at approximately
7:20 p.m., they were assaulted, abducted and then murdered at a
secluded location by three men."6
The court held that landowners are not bound to anticipate the
criminal activities of strangers when an incident occurs precip-
itously. However, a duty to protect invitees might be imposed if an
attack were reasonably foreseeable.6 7 According to the terms of
DiVincenzo, it could be inferred that no dangerous condition ex-
isted and the murders were unforeseeable because there had never
been a prior serious crime against persons on the FAU campus. As
a result, there was no duty to protect the students from criminal
assault.68 Thus, the duty of care owed an invitee is a function of
the foreseeability of attack upon an invitee."
DiVincenzo and Relyea appear to be at fundamental odds on
the threshold question of what circumstances give rise to the duty
to protect. Before the attack on DiVincenzo there had been no
other instances of similar criminal activity on the premises.70 In
Relyea, this absence of similar criminal activity on the FAU cam-
pus was crucial to the finding that no duty existed. Certainly, FAU
foresaw the possibility of harm coming to one of its students at
some future point in time and, recognizing an obligation, employed
a security force. The threat was self-evident. 1
What FAU could not foresee was the particular threat posed by
the three murderers.72  Having taken general steps to prevent
66. Id. at 1380.
67. Id. at 1382-83.
68. Id. at 1383.
69. Browder, supra note 38, at 151.
70. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
71. Generally, persons are entitled to assume that others will be law abiding-
There is normally much less reason to anticipate acts on the part of others
which are malicious and intentionally damaging than those which are merely neg-
ligent; and this is all the more true where, as is usually the case, such acts are
criminal. Under all ordinary and normal circumstances, in the absence of any rea-
son to expect the contrary, the actor may reasonably proceed upon the assump-
tion that others will obey the criminal law.
W. Paossan, supra note 3, § 33, at 173-74 (emphasis added). As can be seen, exception is
made where criminal acts are foreseeable. See infra notes 129-43 and accompanying text,
72. Compare Reichenbach v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1981) (Cowart, J., specially concurring) with DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87-88. (Reich-
enbach adopted a more subjective view of foreseeability). "By their very nature assaults
usually occur suddenly and without warning and without giving an opportunity to defend.
Therefore, to prevent an assault by one person upon another requires an opportunity arising
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crime, 3 the college was under no further duty on the night of the
murders. However, should the campus see another tragic assault,
the school, having notice, would again have its precautions tested
for their reasonableness. Such is the broad reading of Relyea. Nar-
rowly read, the case requires the awareness of a particular attack's
predictability and the means to do something about it before the
court would impose liability.7 '
Nevertheless, DiVincenzo and Relyea agree on the use of negli-
gence principles to determine whether a duty exists. In this re-
spect, they differ somewhat from Holley, which relied alternatively
on contract and tort theory to impose liability. 75 By relying solely
on tort theory, DiVincenzo answered the question reserved by the
Third District in Ten Associates v. McCutchen,7 6 wherein that
court refused to decide whether foreseeability alone was a suffi-
cient basis for the duty in Florida.
"Whatever may be the proper legal analysis, most of the recent
cases have explicitly or implicitly asserted the foreseeability re-
quirement. 7 7 In those cases where the cause of action has sounded
in contract, the tort concept of foreseeability has been of little sig-
nificance.7 8 But, courts recognizing the duty to sound in negligence
instruct that the duty to protect in a given situation is a function
from some specific knowledge, notice or warning." Reichenbach, 401 So. 2d at 1369 (foot-
note omitted). See infra notes 99-122.
73. FAU employed a campus police force whose modus operandi was a discretionary or
planning function, and not subject to judicial oversight. Relyea, 385 So. 2d at 1382.
74. Such a reading would concur with Judge Cowart's opinion in Reichenbach, but
would be contrary to Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1983) (refusing to limit proof
of foreseeability to evidence of a particular assailant's propensity for violence where the
tavern owners knowledge of the likelihood of violence was based upon past experience); see
also Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc. v. Evenrud, 436 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
75. Holley, 382 So. 2d at 99-100. See also Kline, 439 F.2d at 481; Ten Assocs., 398 So. 2d
at 862 n.2. Several grounds were offered for holding the landlord liable in Kline, including
that the landlord's duty to maintain the common areas in a reasonably safe condition ex-
tended to taking protective steps where crime was reasonably foreseeable. 439 F.2d at 480-
81. The court found the analogy between today's landlord-tenant relationship and the inn-
keeper-guest relationship compelling. Id. at 482-83. Finally, the court held that the landlord
impliedly contracted to take those protective measures which he alone was in a position to
take, and to maintain the same relative degree of security throughout the tenancy. Id. at
485-86.
76. 398 So. 2d 860, 862 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla.
1981).
77. Browder, supra note 38, at 151; see DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87-88; Relyea, 385 So.
2d at 1382-83; cf. Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
But cf. Schoen v. Gilbert, 436 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1983) (since "a difference in floor levels is not
an inherently dangerous condition, even in dim lighting, a homeowner has no duty to warn
of such condition as a matter of law").
78. See, e.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980).
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of the foreseeability of criminal attack.7
On the issue of what notice the landlord had that his tenants
were in danger within the confines of their building, relevance and
probity are less certain as evidence of crime in the area and past
security practices is introduced. Courts take various approaches to
the admission as evidence of crime which has occurred in the
neighborhood and not just on the victimized tenant's premises or
apartment building.80 For example, Maryland courts find relevant
only those prior acts occurring in the common areas of the injured
tenant's building."' This narrower focus is in line with that taken
by the Relyea court.82 On the other hand, DiVincenzo concluded
that the attack could have been foreseen in part because of the
building's location adjacent to a high-crime area, and in part be-
cause of the landlord's past security practices.8
The dissent in DiVincenzo pointed out the building's lack of a
79. See generally Browder, supra note 38, at 151 (discussing the scope of the new duty).
Whether the landlord could foresee the criminal act causing the injury is a question of fact
for the jury. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. Yet, the existence of a duty in
the first instance "is entirely a question of law." W. PsossEa, supra note 3, § 37, at 206.
80. Compare Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (Md. 1976) with Di Vincenzo, 432 So. 2d
at 88.
81. See Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548 (Md. 1976). "[O]rdinarfly only criminal acts oc-
curring on the landlord's premises, and of which he knows or should have known (and not
those occurring generally in the surrounding neighborhood) constitute relevant factors in
determining.. . the reasonable measures which a landlord is under a duty to take to keep
the premises safe." Id. at 554. See also Totten v. More Oakland Residential Hous., Inc., 134
Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
82. Relyea, 385 So. 2d at 1382-83. Accord Admiral's Port Condominium Assoc., Inc. v.
Feldman, 426 So. 2d 1054, 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (court adopted the view that
"[e]vidence of similar crimes committed off the premises and against persons other than the
landowner's invitees is not probative of foreseeability") (emphasis added). In Crown Liquors
of Broward, Inc. v. Evenrud, 436 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the court stated:
[Aissuming arguendo the admissibility of all the evidence as to Crown's reputation
as a trouble spot, such evidence does not support proof of any specific knowledge
on Crown's part that Evenrud was in danger of being injured.
Crown does have a general duty to use reasonable care ... [hlowever, this duty
does not require Crown "to guard against the risk created by a specific patron,
unless [it] has actual or constructive knowledge of the need for specific supervi-
sion and a reasonable opportunity to exercise it."
Id. at 930 (emphasis in original). See also Babrab, Inc. v. Allen, 408 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1981); Lucks v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 399 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); High-
lands Ins. Co. v. Gilday, 398 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for rev. denied, 411 So. 2d
382 (Fla. 1981); Drake v. Sun Bank & Trust Co., 377 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979);
Warner v. Florida Jai Alai, Inc., 221 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), cert. discharged,
235 So. 2d 294 (Fla 1970); see generally Gottschalk v. Smith, 334 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA
1976); Murray v. Osenton, 126 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
83. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87-88.
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history of crime." Nevertheless, the majority held there was ade-
quate proof of a dangerous condition.8 Yet, for two years while the
dangerous condition persisted at the adjacent shopping center,"
the security measures in place at the office building provided, it
would seem, an adequate deterrent to crime within the building.
One might ask what notice was provided the landlord, other than
the general occurrence of crime in modern society, that his precau-
tions were inadequate, ineffective or unreasonable up until that
time? Reasonable inquiry would have found no prior breach of se-
curity. In short, that the assault would occur on the premises in
DiVincenzo was probably as unforeseeable as that it would occur
on the FAU campus in Relyea.s7
According to the court in Goldberg v. Housing Authority," any-
one "can foresee the commission of crime virtually anywhere and
at any time.""9 The court stated that imposition of the duty is a
question of fairness, considering the relationship of the parties, the
nature of the risk, and the consequences of imposing the duty." "If
foreseeability itself gave rise to a duty to provide 'police' protec-
tion for others, every residential curtilage, every shop, every store,
every manufacturing plant would have to be patrolled by the pri-
vate arms of the owner." 1 Kline retorted that "[tjhis language
seems to indicate that the court was using the word foreseeable
interchangeably with the word possible. . . .But we must reach
the question of liability for attacks which are foreseeable in the
84. Id. at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 87. Cf. Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843, 851 (Mich.
1975) (landlord, when informed that the presence of a state mental health clinic within the
building was of concern to other tenants, had a duty to investigate and take available pre-
ventive measures, although no prior attack had occurred).
86. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
87. See generally Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947). There the employer, under a
statutory duty to protect employees, required the petitioner, a 22-year old telegraph opera-
tor, to work alone at night in a one room building located in an isolated part of the rail yard
without exterior illumination, guards or any means to visually identify trainmen coming for
messages other than to unlock the door. One of the dangerous characters the respondent
had reason to know frequented the railyard seriously injured the young lady. The Court
held dismissal of her complaint improper as the peculiar conditions created a likelihood of
misconduct. Id. at 460-62. Thus, under some circumstances it can be seen how an attack
could be foreseen without the need for prior similar occurrences.
88. 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962).
89. Id. at 293.
90. Id. The plaintiff was a milkman. The court explained that the duty to provide police
protection is the government's, that the vagueness of the duty did not allow one to ascertain
in advance of the jury's verdict the nature of the duty and whether it was being discharged
and that the cost would be borne by those least able to afford it. Id. at 293-98.
91. Id. at 293.
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sense that they are probable and predictable.''92
As the evidence tends toward proving the possible rather than
the predictable, only a jury's conception of reasonableness prevents
the unpalatable outcome envisioned in Goldberg. Therefore, a
standard for testing foreseeability should require that the landlord
have notice which can be implied from some circumstances. 9 Once
forewarned that tenants are in danger due to remediable inadequa-
cies in building security, the threshold should be satisfied." Evi-
dence, to be admissible on the issue of foreseeability, should show
that a prudent person would have had notice of a dangerous condi-
tion which reasonably required those additional measures the
plaintiff points out as available to deter a given type of incident."
Since a landlord cannot be expected to do anything about danger-
ous conditions surrounding an apartment building, the scope of the
duty should be limited to only those risks which a landlord can
remedy." Under such a standard, given the prior history of crime
on the premises, the prudent landlord would be alerted that his
security precautions were not preventing crime.'7 This is not to say
92. Kline, 439 F.2d at 483.
93. See supra note 87.
94. See Warner v. Florida Jai Alai, Inc., 221 So. 2d 777, 778-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969),
cert. discharged, 235 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1970).
Under the evidentiary test for the introduction of similar factual evidence, exclusion will
not be held error where the propounder fails "to show sufficient similarity of the conditions,
causes and circumstances surrounding both incidents." I.B.L. Corp. v. Florida Power &
Light Co., 400 So. 2d 1288, 1288-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Similarity of circumstance should
also be a factor used in determining the relevance of crime reports from the surrounding
neighborhood. Further, even if relevant, evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1981). The
difference between the two exclusionary rules is that under an J.B.L. Corp.-type test, the
tenant would bear the burden of showing similarity, while under § 90.403 the landlord
would bear the burden of showing that the probative value is outweighed by the danger of
prejudice.
95. See Highlands Ins. Co. v. Gilday, 398 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for rev.
denied, 411 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1981). Plaintiff was beaten and robbed in a hotel restroom while
a business invitee of the lounge. Testimony of crimes occurring throughout police zone 15
was entered over the defendant's objection. Zone 15 is approximately three miles long and
one-half mile wide and the computer printout from which the police records supervisor tes-
tified did not specify location of the crime. 398 So. 2d at 835-36. On appeal the court held
"that this evidence [is] not probative of this litigation's fundamental question-notice to
the appellant hotel that there was a necessity to protect its guests against criminal attacks."
Id. at 836. Evidence of both crime in the area and past building security practices have been
admitted by other courts. E.g., DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87-88.
96. Nor for that matter will an action lie against the police. Relyea, 385 So. 2d at 1382.
97. Cf. Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548 (Md. 1976) (liability would be imposed when the
landlord had reason to be aware that his premises were particularly conducive to crime and
could reasonably be expected to do something about it).
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that those precautions should then be found unreasonable, as not
even the best efforts can totally prevent crime and reasonable pre-
cautions may only deter some criminals. Furthermore, since the
prior crime or crimes occurring in the landlord's building would
not have to be similar in order to alert the landlord to the security
problem on the premises, no such similarity should be required."8
However, account would be taken of the nature of any prior crimi-
nal activity to determine the reasonableness of the precautions in
effect."
VI. PRIOR SECURITY PRACTICES AS AN ADMISSION THAT CRIME
WAS FORESEEABLE
DiVincenzo could have grounded liability on an implied contract
theory, to the effect that the landlord implicitly agreed to maintain
the same relative degree of security throughout the tenancy.1°
Nonetheless, the court chose to adopt negligence principles exclu-
sively. Since the building record was clean of past criminal activ-
ity,101 the court found the landlord owed the tenant a duty in part
by reasoning that if crime were not foreseeable, the landlord would
not have instituted security measures in the first place.10
It is doubtful whether use of past security practices to establish
the existence of a duty is a sound basis for policy decisions. If the
impetus for the duty to protect is to provide incentive for land-
lords to increase apartment security, then to hold landlords liable
because, having increased security, they can be said to have fore-
seen crime thwarts this underlying purpose. Perhaps recognizing
these conflicting signals, one commentator has counseled against
taking protective steps.10 The shrewd landlord might choose not
98. But see Relyea, 385 So. 2d at 1383; Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841 (Va.
1974).
99. As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occur-
rence may correspondingly decrease while the act remains negligent. E.g., United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
100. See, e.g., Kline, 439 F.2d at 485; Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust,
503 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (D. Kan. 1980); see also Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Re-
sponsibility for Tenant Security, 71 COLUM. L. Rzv., 275, 285 n.80 (1971).
101. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 89 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 88. See Ten Assocs., 398 So. 2d at 862. In Holley, the landlord's prior prac-
tice, while not setting the standard for reasonable care, constituted "an admissible indica-
tion of the defendant's own 'knowledge of the risk and the precautions necessary to meet
it."' Holley, 382 So. 2d at 100 (citing W. Paossaa, supra note 3, § 33, at 168). The safety or
accident record of a particular practice also indicates knowledge of the risk and of the pre-
cautions necessary to meet it. Id.
103. Henszey & Weisman, supra note 1, at 112.
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to institute protective measures for fear of being found clairvoyant,
being held to an implied contract, or being liable for misfea-
sance.1 '" Use of prior practice as an admission that crime generally
was forseen and that consequently a duty existed therefore seems
unwise.
Doubtful also is the even more limited use to which evidence of
past security practice was put in Kline. 05 Requiring the landlord
to maintain security as it was when the lease was made either im-
poses differing degrees of care as to each tenant,'0 ' or stultifies any
technological change in protective measures, as a jury can find any
such change ipso facto a reduction. When past security practice is
used in finding an implied contract that such practices will be car-
ried on throughout the tenancy, a duty so based might be orally
waived or waived by the insertion of a clause so providing in a
lease.107 Furthermore, implying a promise that security will not be
reduced, on a theory of detrimental reliance, 0 8 is less than satisfy-
ing where a tenant continues residence for several years after se-
curity is reduced, as was the case in Kline'" and DiVincenzo."0
Thus, if a quasi-contractual basis grounds the duty, comparative
negligence principles would not be applied to reduce the tenant's
award, as was done in DiVincenzo."'
104. E.g., Scott, 359 A.2d at 555 (improper performance constitutes misfeasance); Corn-
propst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (distinguishing between misfeasance and non-
feasance); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3D 331 (1973).
105. Cf. supra note 43 (past practice an admission and some evidence of reasonable
care).
106. Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises,
62 HARv. L. Rzv. 669, 671 n.16 (1949).
107. See infra notes 157-70 and accompanying text.
108. Cf. Javins v. First Natl Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("[slince the lessees continue to pay the same rent, they were entitled to
expect that the landlord would continue to keep the premises in their beginning condition
during the lease term"). Detrimental reliance need not be alleged or proved, but is merely
offered as justification for imposing the duty. See Ten Assocs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860
(Fla. 3d DCA), petition for rev. denied, 411 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1981).
109. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 490 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (Kline was a month-to-
month tenant). As a result of the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence, im-
plied assumption of risk has been merged into the affirmative defense of contributory negli-
gence. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
110. DiVincenzo, 432 So. 2d at 87.
111. E.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); see Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone &
Webster Eng'g Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1973); see also Recent Developments,
supra note 54, at 1518.
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VII. OTHER THRESHOLD TESTS FOR IMPOSING THE DuTY
The Florida Supreme Court, in Mansur v. Eubanks,11 ' required
landlords to maintain "reasonably safe" dwellings, recognizing that
"[w]e live in an age when the complexities of housing construction
place the landlord in much better position than the tenant to
guard against dangerous conditions."I ' s Mansur's introduction of
common-law notions of warranty of habitability was limited to
maintenance of the physical structure.""" However, the case may
yet affect the final form of the emerging duty to protect against
crime. Holley, in stating that the duty "to keep the common areas
reasonably safe" might require that landlords post security
guards,1 had no problem relying on the traditional rule that land-
lords are required to maintain common areas in a safe physical
condition.1 6 Other jurisdictions already extend the doctrine of im-
plied warranty of habitability to include provisions for tenant se-
curity.1 1 7 Thus, a warranty of security has been developing, di-
vorced from the landlord's retention of physical control, which
appears suitable for adaptation to Florida's single-family detached
housing.1 "
Other states have adopted threshold tests for finding a duty to
protect. For example, Illinois courts have long held that the exis-
tence of the duty is a question of law, to be determined by balanc-
ing the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that burden
on the defendant. 11 9 However, should a landlord undertake to pro-
vide security and do so negligently, the landlord may be held
liable.120
In Trentacost v. Brussel,121 the court recognized an implied war-
112. 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981).
113. Id. at 1330.
114. Id.
115. Holley, 382 So. 2d at 99.
116. The cases relied upon were Butler v. Maney, 200 So. 226 (Fla. 1941) and Hester v.
Guarino, 251 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), cert. denied, 259 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1972). See
also Westerbeke v. Reynolds, 19 So. 2d 413 (Fi. 1944); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 417
(1968).
117. E.g., Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980).
118. But see Escobar v. Brent General Hosp., 308 N.W.2d 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(landlord has no duty to provide continuous security personnel).
119. E.g., Barnes v. Washington, 305 N.E.2d 535 (I1. 1973); see also L. GREzN, JuDGs
AND JURY 53-54 (1930); F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 18.8 (1956).
120. E.g., Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv's., 412 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (Ill. 1980); Phillips
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 414 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
121. 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980). See generally Recent Developments, supra note 54, at
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ranty of habitability based on the shortage of housing and the
landlord's position of power,""2 which required the landlord to pro-
vide "reasonable safeguards to protect tenants from foreseeable
criminal activity on the premises.""'1j Despite use of the word
"foreseeable" in Trentacost, the court held that notice of an unsafe
condition need not be shown "[s]ince the landlord's implied under-
taking to provide adequate security exists independently of his
knowledge of any risks."""4 In effect, the landlord-tenant relation-
ship became indistinguishable from the innkeeper-guest relation-
ship.12 5 Trentacost has been said to "hold landlords strictly ac-
countable for every crime committed on their property, without
regard to the reasonableness of their precautions or their knowl-
edge of any risk. 126
In Massachusetts, a recent case held that "a duty finds its
'source in existing social values and customs.' "1127 The court took
cognizance of the care colleges customarily observe in protecting
resident students and found that their recognition of the obligation
indicated that "the imposition of a duty of care is firmly embedded
in a community consensus."' 2 8
VIII. CAUSE IN FACT AND ITS EFFECT ON THE DUTY'S ANALYSIS
The fact of causation12 9 must be established by a preponderance
of the evidence,"30 but the sine qua non test'3 1 has been only a
1513-21 (discussing the decision in Trentacost).
122. Trentacost, 412 A.2d at 442. See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
123. Trentacost, 412 A.2d at 443.
124. Id.
125. Recent Developments, supra note 54, at 1515. The duty is imposed solely because
of the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship. However, the "adequate precautions"
standard imposed by Trentacost is arguably more difficult than the "reasonableness" stan-
dard imposed in negligence cases as, regardless of those taken, the precautions have proved
inadequate on at least one occasion.
126. Browder, supra note 38, at 150.
127. Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983), quoting Schofield
v. Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339, 341 (Mass. 1982).
128. Mulins, 449 N.E.2d at 335.
129. Proximate cause consists of foreseeability and causation in fact. Foreseeability is
used to determine whether social policy is served by holding one liable for another's injury.
Causation in fact has been defined simply as follows: "The defendant's conduct is not a
cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." W. PRossEi, supra note 3,
§ 41, at 239. See Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 1983)
(Boyd, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 448-49 (1965).
130. Heyman v. United States, 506 F. Supp. at 1145, 1150 (S.D. Fla. 1981); see also
Greene v. Flewelling, 366 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); FLA. STANDARu JURY INSTR. (Crv.)
5.1(a) (1982).
131. See Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
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slightly more burdensome impediment to tenant recovery than the
argument that a criminal act is an independent intervening cause
which insulates the landlord from liability.13 2 The intervening
cause argument was rejected as "entirely fallacious"133 by the Hol-
ley court.
Cause in fact is generally a jury question.1 To satisfy the test,
the landlord's neglect needs to be a material and substantial factor
in bringing about the tenant's injury.1 85 Where the chance of injury
would have been slight had some additional measure been taken,
courts have refused to overturn jury decisions finding absence of
the addition unreasonable.136 In this regard some have called for
greater judicial activism, believing that cases have gone to juries
where there was no proof that the injury could have been pre-
vented had the added precautions been taken.13 7
In Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R.,' suit was brought
by a guest who had been brutalized in the interior hallway of the
defendant's hotel. The district court held that "[c]ausation, like
any other element of plaintiff's case, need not be demonstrated by
conclusive proof. . . .Plaintiff adduced evidence that reasonable
measures were not taken... .. Thus the question of whether de-
fendant's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
was properly a jury question." 139
Dissenting, Judge Cowart argued:
The majority opinion effectively imposes a form of strict liabil-
ity upon landowners and businesses. It is axiomatic that a per-
son's duty should not be greater than his ability to meet that
duty. Security measures... may increase a potential assailant's
perception of his risk of apprehension and thereby discourage or
132. See Holley, 382 So. 2d at 101; see also McCord v. Sentry Protection, Inc., 427 So.
2d 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Johnston v. Harris, 198 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 1972); Braitman v.
Overlook Terrace Corp., 346 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1975). These cases all adopt the enhanced-risk-
plus-foreseeability test for liability. Recent Developments, supra note 54, at 1505. See gen-
erally FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTR. (Civ.) 5.1(c) (1982).
133. Holley, 382 So. 2d at 101.
134. See, e.g., Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980).
135. Cf. Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 191 (Fla. 1953). See generally W. PRossER,
supra note 3, § 41, at 240.
136. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 448. "Circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or common
knowledge may provide a basis from which the causal sequence may be inferred.... Such
questions are peculiarly for the jury.. . ." W. Piwssmi, supra note 3, § 41, at 242.
137. See Robbins, 433 So. 2d at 494 (Boyd, J., dissenting); Reichenbach, 401 So. 2d at
1367 (Cowart, J., specially concurring).
138. 402 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
139. Id. at 448.
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deter some persons sometimes; however, they do not, and cannot,
prevent a particular assault made without warning by a deter-
mined assailant in an area commonly open to the public. There-
fore, any duty of care should be likewise limited. By imposing lia-
bility for failing to take reasonable security precautions without
requiring that the assault would have been (not might have been)
prevented by taking those precautions, the majority has effec-
tively eliminated any real requirement of proximate cause and
foreseeability in actions of this type.
140
Although P.D.R. dealt with an innkeeper-guest relationship rather
than a landlord-tenant relationship, that difference is not enough
by itself to call for a different outcome in most instances given the
general foreseeability of crime. 41 Further, the case relies on and
finds analogous Holley, which dealt with the landlord-tenant
relationship.1 42
Despite Judge Cowart's lucidity, the trend is toward jury settle-
ment, a development which should put fear into the hearts not
only of landlords but anyone holding an estate in land and charge-
able with notice of the foreseeable nature of crime on that land.
143
IX. THE ROLE OF THE JURY-DETERMINING THE STANDARD OF
CARE
Generally, the response to the concern that landlords face some-
thing akin to strict liability"44 has been that trial by jury is the
proper method of determining both foreseeability and security pre-
cautions reasonably required to discharge the duty to protect in a
given situation.1 45 Once the existence of a duty is found, tradition
has established the jury as the legitimate body for divining com-
mon prudence.14 e The standard of care applied by the jury requires
140. Id. at 451-52 (Cowart, J., dissenting).
141. If the general incidence of crime in a neighborhood will suffice to give rise to the
landlord's duty to protect, the threshold has been overcome and both the landlord's and
innkeeper's precautions will be equally scrutinized for reasonableness.
142. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 446.
143. The landowner may have a duty to his invitee to reasonably protect the invitee
from foreseeable criminal attack. Further, a tenant's social guest may also have a valid cause
of action against a landlord should the crime be foreseeable. See Medina, 405 So. 2d 485;
Relyea, 385 So. 2d 1378; but see Wood, 284 So. 2d at 695.
144. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 451 (Cowart, J., dissenting).
145. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Johstoneaux, 395 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) and
cases cited therein.
146. E.g., Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 104 (D.C. 1980); Ten Assocs., 398 So.
2d at 862-63; Holley, 382 So. 2d at 100-01.
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them to ascertain what would have been reasonable care on the
landlord's part given all the circumstances.
14 7
Generally no trouble is found with employing this vague stan-
dard.148 After all, it "is no more obscure or unfair than the univer-
sal test of reasonableness which permeates the law."" However,
the Florida Supreme Court has shown displeasure with the use of
such a standard on at least one occasion.
We decline to recognize the purportedly innocuous rule sug-
gested... that a jury should merely be instructed that the duty
of care of the landowner is "whether the landowner's actions were
reasonable in light of all the factual circumstances in the case."
This is too vague and unreasonable a test to apply to a landowner
because of the remaining, inherent distinctions in relationships
involved between persons who come upon an owner's property;
neither does it sufficiently afford a reasonable standard which can
be applied as a measure by the jury. Some guidelines which the
jury can apply to the facts in arriving at a just verdict, are
indicated.' 50
One court has found an instance where the jury might not be
allowed to decide the standard of care.151 The court stated:
We have not implied either in the cited cases or in this one that
when criminal activity is foreseeable it is invariably a jury ques-
tion as to whether the duty of reasonable care has been dis-
charged. In the case of a mom-and-pop store with one or two em-
ployees, for example, it might be unreasonable as a matter of law
to require that a full-time guard be posted."5
Apparently recognizing the difficulties presented by use of such
a vague test, the district court in P.D.R.15 3 set out particular fac-
tors for the jury's consideration. Those factors were found in a
Wisconsin opinion of which the majority approved. 1' As for the
147. E.g., Ten Assocs., 398 So. 2d at 862-63.
148. Note, supra note 3, at 1180-81.
149. Id. at 1181.
150. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973).
151. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Johstoneaux, 395 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
152. Id. at 600 n.4. See also P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 447. "Obviously, a six-unit, one build-
ing 'Mom and Pop' motel will not have the same security problems as a large highrise thou-
sand room hotel.... " Id. (emphasis added). The small motel may nevertheless have large
problems.
153. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 447.
154. Id. (citing Peters v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 208 (Wis. 1979)).
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"Wisconsin factors," their absence will not mean that the inn-
keeper is liable as a matter of law. However, neither does the pres-
ence of each preclude the innkeeper's liability. 155 The test remains
for landowners, generally, that of reasonableness under all the cir-
cumstances. Thus, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis.
It has been said that if the question of liability goes to the jury
under such a standard, "the often quoted expression, 'the landlord
is not an insurer of his tenants' safety,' will be mere pabulum."'
X. EXCULPATION & WAIVER
In Kline the dissent noted that landlords might be forced to
contract against liability "by contracting for exculpatory provisions
in leases."'1 5 Early commentary dismissed this view, stating that
such exculpatory provisions would be against public policy (and
thus void) in many jurisdictions. 6' But the possibility that the
Florida lease may successfully pardon a landlord's nonperformance
of the new duty is of concern. Continued judicial toleration of ex-
culpatory clauses can thwart the new duty before it has had its
desired effect-the increased security of Florida's tenants. 5
The reason for concern is, first, that the landlord's response to
the imposition of the duty will be to attempt the exigent of excul-
pation. 60 Second, courts that are unable to meaningfully define or
limit the duty using negligence principles, or that perceive that the
duty is impossible to discharge, may be more receptive to contrac-
tual limitations on liability over which they retain greater con-
trol. 6" The result might be that "tenants will get less instead of
more protection."1 62 However, if exculpation is not permitted and
155. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d at 448. See Rosier v. Gainsville Inns Assoc., Ltd., 347 So. 2d
1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (evidence of industry standard for locks admissible); Rob-
bins, 433 So. 2d at 493 (absence of industry standard does not insulate a defendant from
liability); cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) (radio sets for tugboats), cert.
denied sub nom., Eastern Trans. Co. v. Northern Barge Corp., 287 U.S. 662 (1932). See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 33, at 166-68.
156. Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 113 (D.C. 1980) (Nebeker, A.J., dissenting);
cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Dorn, 292 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
157. Kline, 439 F.2d at 493 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
158. E.g., Note, supra note 3, at 1197.
159. Compare Middleton v. Lomaskin, 268 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972) with John's
Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (FhL 2d DCA 1979).
160. See generally Comment, Drafting Exculpatory Clauses in a Landlord-Tenant Re-
lationship, 21 U. MtMlw L. REv. 676 (1967).
161. The construction of a lease is normally a question of law for the court. E.g., Peacock
Construction Co. v. Modern Air Conditioning, Inc., 353 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1977).
162. Kline, 439 F.2d at 493 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
LANDLORD- TENANT
the nature and scope of the duty prevails as at present, landlords
will likely become the insurers of tenant safety.
While exculpatory clauses are disfavored, 163 generally, persons in
Florida may be relieved of their own negligence by the use of such
clauses when clearly stating their effect as such.'" In Mansur the
court, while adopting the doctrine of implied warranty of habita-
bility in Florida residential housing, stated: "This duty may be
modified by agreement of the parties. After the tenant takes pos-
session, the landlord has a continuing duty . . . unless waived by
the tenant."16 Section 83.51(1)(b), Florida Statutes,"" the statu-
tory warranty of habitability, states in part: "The landlord's obli-
gations under this subsection may be altered or modified in writ-
ing with respect to a single-family home or duplex. ''" 1 7 Such does
not alter the rule announced by section 83.47(1)(b) 16 that clauses
generally limiting the landlord's liability are void in Florida resi-
dential leases. Therefore, absent more, residential landlords may
not exculpate from, nor tenants waive, the negligent failure to dis-
charge the duty to protect.'
XI. CONCLUSION
The trend of judicial opinion has been to hold landlords liable
for foreseeable criminal attack on their tenants. The reason for
finding a duty to protect in general has been to provide landlords
with the economic incentive to upgrade apartment security over
and above the housing market's competitive incentive. However, if
landlords can expect to be held liable no matter what standard of
care they adopt, any additional incentive will be lost. The result
will be that the new duty will have only prospective effect, com-
pensating tenants for damage done. Thus, to have its intended ef-
fect, the standard of care must be such that the maintenance of
163. E.g., Goyings v. Jack & Ruth Eckerd Found., 403 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
164. Id. at 1146; Feuntes v. Owen, 310 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Middleton,
266 So. 2d at 680.
165. Id. at 1330.
166. FLA. STAT. § 83.51(1)(b) (1981).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. "(1) A provision in a rental agreement is void and unenforceable to the extent that
it: ... (b) Purports to limit or preclude any liability of the landlord to the tenant or of the
tenant to the landlord, arising under law." FLA. STAT. § 83.47 (1981). See also FLA. STAT. §
83.45(1)(b) (1981) (regarding an unconscionable rental agreement or provision).
169. FLA. STAT. § 83.47 (1981); see HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 216-18 (1972); Comment, Unconscionability: A New Help-
ing Hand to Residential Tenants, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 993.
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reasonable precautions will discharge the duty. Reasonableness
must be capable of some degree of determination in advance and
must be in fact attainable.
If we entertain the plausible assumption that criminals, bent on
committing crime, will choose the least protected victim and that
crime can be deterred but not wholly prevented in our society, the
solution providing optimal deterrence can only be supplied by soci-
ety acting in concert. Historically this has meant that as long as
one does not invite crime upon another, government has the re-
sponsibility for protecting society. In fact, providing for social or-
der has long been a prime task of governments.
Rather than producing a more secure population, the imposition
of the duty to protect, if serving a purpose other than compensa-
tion, will only serve to redistribute crime. Therefore, landlords
should be required to take only those precautions commonly taken
by persons similarly situated who own the property on which they
reside. A tenant deserves to be compensated differently from land-
owners generally only because, as an incident of the tenant's rela-
tively brief attachment to a given property, the landlord is the only
party who can feasibly invest capital in the premises. Thus, it
would be inappropriate to require more from landlords than simi-
larly situated homeowners or condominium owners require of
themselves.
If the judiciary takes it upon itself to require that precautions be
taken, not only should a landlord be able to tell in advance
whether the duty has been discharged but the standard of care
should also be attainable and comport with that exercised by soci-
ety generally. Otherwise, courts will only be requiring tenants to
purchase insurance against attack in the form of increased rental
cost.
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